Abstract-This work considers the problem of detecting corrupted components in a large scale decentralized system via local model information. The electric power system, the transportation system, and generally any computer or network system are examples of large scale systems for which external (cyber) attacks have become an important threat. We consider the case of linear networks, and we model a cyber attack as an exogenous input that compromises the behavior of a set of components. We exploit two distributed methods that rely on two different sets of assumptions to achieve detection and identification. The first method takes advantage of the presence in the network of weakly interconnected subparts, it requires limited knowledge of the network model, and it affords local detection and identification of misbehaving components whose behavior deviates more than a threshold. The second method relies on the presence of a set of trustworthy leaders with better computation and communication capabilities. Only relying on a partial knowledge of the network model, the leaders cooperatively detect and identify misbehaving components.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing reliance on network systems to support critical operations in defense, electric power management, and telecommunication raises the issue of reliability and robustness of such systems against external attacks. Because of the decentralized nature of network systems, cyber attacks compromising the availability of resources, the integrity of data, or the confidentiality of information are easily launched by a malignant agent. Furthermore, the growing dimension of network systems forbids any centralized implementation of an attack detection system, ruling out classical solutions as presented in [1] .
The detection and the identification of misbehaving agents in a network has been the subject of intensive study among the computer scientists interested in distributed computing. In this work, we focus on the fundamental task of computing an agreement (consensus) on a variable of interest via distributed computation and in the presence of misbehaving agents. We consider the extreme case of Byzantine agents, which are omniscient, and which collude in order to cause the biggest damage to the network. In the last few years, the problem of reaching consensus in the presence of misbehaving components has been revisited from a control theoretic perspective. In these works, the network is assumed to evolve as a linear dynamical system, and the misbehaving agents are modeled as unknown and unmeasurable inputs. In [2] the problem of detecting and identifying misbehaving agents in a linear consensus network is first introduced, and a solution is proposed for the single faulty agent case. In [3] , the authors provide a policy that k malicious agents can follow to prevent some of the nodes of a 2k-connected 1 network from computing the desired function of the initial state, or, equivalently, from reaching an agreement. On the contrary, if the connectivity is 2k + 1 or more, then the authors show that generically the set of misbehaving nodes is identified independent of its behavior, so that the desired consensus is eventually reached. Finally, in [4] the connection between the graph connectivity and the zero dynamics of a specific linear system associated with the network is explained, and a complete characterization of the policies that make a set of misbehaving agents undetectable is given. Despite the advances in the theoretical understanding of the detection and identification of misbehaving agents, efficient decentralized algorithms ensuring security against attacks are still missing. The procedures proposed so far rely indeed on an heavy combinatorial machinery to locate the attackers, they require every agent to have complete knowledge of the network structure, and they need a number of steps proportional to the cardinality of the network to converge. Therefore, although provably correct, the existing algorithms for misbehavior detection and identification are practically applicable only when the dimension of the network is relatively small.
The main contribution of this work are as follows. We present two novel methods to reduce the computational cost of the existing detection and identification algorithms. The proposed procedures rely on two different sets of assumptions, and they can be alternatively employed depending on the network model. The first method is designed to exploit the presence in a network of weakly interconnected subparts. We introduce a notion of network decentralization, in terms of relatively weakly connected subnetworks, and derive a sufficient condition on the consensus matrix that allows to identify a certain class of misbehaving agents under limited information on the network structure. The second method admits the presence of a subset of agents with better computation and communication capabilities (leaders), and it achieves exact detection and identification even when the entire network structure is not available to any of the leaders. Under the assumption that the leaders coincide with the vertices of a connected communication graph, two algorithms are proposed to distributively reconstruct the state of the network in the presence of an unknown input, and to detect the presence of a misbehaving agent. Both algorithms require only a limited knowledge of the network structure, and they are shown to converge in a finite number of steps. We conclude the paper by showing the effectiveness of our algorithms through a numerical study.
The rest of the material is organized as follows. Section II contains the problem setting. Section III describes our method to exploit the presence of weakly interconnected subnetworks, and Section IV contains an example. Sections V introduces the hierarchical structure we propose, and it contains our main results on the unknown input estimation problem and on the detection problem. Sections VI and VII contain respectively a numerical study and our conclusion.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
Let G denote a directed graph with vertex set V = {1, . . . , n} and edge set E ⊆ V × V . The (in)-neighbor set of a node i ∈ V , i.e., all the nodes j ∈ V such that the pair (j, i) ∈ E, is denoted with N i . We let each vertex j ∈ V denote an autonomous agent, and we associate a real number x j with each agent j. Let the vector x contain the values x j . A linear consensus algorithm over G is an update rule for x and it is described by the linear discrete time system
where the matrix A is row-stochastic and primitive, and where its (i, j)-th entry is nonzero if and only if the pair (j, i) belongs to the edge set of G. We allow for some agents to update their state differently than specified by the matrix A by adding an exogenous input to the consensus system. Let u i , i ∈ V , be the input associated with the i-th agent, and let u be the vector of the functions u i . The consensus system becomes x(t + 1) = Ax(t) + u(t).
Definition 1 (Misbehaving agent): An agent j is misbehaving if there exists a time t ∈ N such that u j (t) = 0, and it is well-behaving otherwise. Let K = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . } ⊆ V denote the set of misbehaving agents, let e i be the i-th vector of the canonical basis, and let B K = [e i1 e i2 · · · ]. The consensus system with misbehaving agents K assumes the form
We associate an output matrix C j to each agent j, which describes the information about the state of the network that is directly available to j. In particular, y j (t) = C j x(t), C j = [e n1 . . . e np ]
T , and {n 1 , . . . , n p } = N j . Throughout the paper, let Im(A) and Ker(A) denote the range space and the null space defined by the matrix A.
III. LOCAL DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION
In this section, after reviewing a basic filter approach to security, we characterize a topological condition that allows for local detection and identification of misbehaving agents. For ease of notation, we consider now the single misbehaving agent case. Let j be a well-behaving agent, and consider the problem of deciding whether the agent i 1 or the agent i 2 is misbehaving. Let the linear discrete time filter
be such that r i1 = 0 if and only if i 1 is misbehaving. Then, the signal r i1 allows to uniquely identify the misbehaving agent i 1 against the well-behaving agent i 2 . By implementing a similar filter for each possible pair 2 of misbehaving agents, the presence of the misbehaving agent i 1 is finally assessed by the agent j. A technique to design the filter (1) can be found in [4] , where the knowledge of the network matrix A by the well-behaving agent j is assumed.
We consider now the case in which each well-behaving agent has a partial knowledge of the network model, and it cannot therefore design the filter presented in (1) . Let A be a consensus matrix, and observe that it can be written as A d + ε∆, where ∆ ∞ = 2, 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1, and A d is block diagonal with a consensus matrix on each of the N diagonal blocks. For instance, let A = [a kj ], and let V 1 , . . . , V N be the subsets of agents associated with the blocks. Then the matrix
Note that, if ε is "small", then the agents belonging to the same group are strongly interacting, while the agents belonging to different groups are weakly coupled (cf. Fig.  1 ). We assume the groups of strongly interacting agents to be given, and we leave the problem of determining such partitions as the subject of future research, for which the ideas presented in [5] constitute a very relevant result.
We now focus on the h-th block. Let K = v ∪ l be the set of misbehaving agents, where v = V j ∩K, and l = K \v. Let j ∈ V h , and consider the system (A d , B v , C j ). Recall from [4] that the misbehaving agents v are identifiable by agent j if the inputs u v and u i can be decoupled, for all i ∈ V \ v.
To be more precise, let + denotes the time shift operation, and consider the systems
and 3
The misbehaving agents v are identifiable by agent j if, for all i ∈ V \ v, we have r v = 0 and r i = 0 whenever u v = 0. It should be noticed that, since A d is block diagonal, the residual generators to identify the set v can be designed by only knowing the h-th block of A d , and hence only a finite region of the original consensus network. Moreover, the misbehaving agents l do not affect the residuals r i , i ∈ V h , so that the agents v are identifiable by agent j if, for all i ∈ V h \ v, we have r v = 0 and r i = 0 whenever u v = 0. By applying the above residual generators to the consensus system A d + ε∆ with misbehaving agents K we get
and
Because of the matrix ∆ and the input u l , the residual r i is generally nonzero even if u i = 0. Notice that, however, the misbehaving agents v remain identifiable by j if for each i ∈ V j \v it holds r v ∞ > r i ∞ for all admissible u v = 0. Theorem 3.1 (Local identification): Let V be the set of agents, let K be the set of misbehaving agents, and let A d +ε∆ be a consensus matrix, where A d is block diagonal, ∆ ∞ = 2, and 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Let each block h of A d be a consensus matrix with agents V h ⊆ V , and with connectivity |K ∩ V h | + 1. There exists α > 0 and u max ≥ 0, such that, if each input signal u i , i ∈ K, takes value in U = {u : εαu max ≤ u ∞ ≤ u max }, then each well-behaving agent j ∈ V h can identify in finite time the faulty agents K ∩ V h .
Proof: We refer the reader to [6] for a proof of the results contained in this paper.
Notice that the constant α in Theorem 3.1 can be computed by bounding the infinity norm of the impulse response of the residual generators. An example follows.
IV. AN EXAMPLE OF LOCAL IDENTIFICATION
We show in this section the advantages of the clustered setup described in Section III. Consider the consensus network in Fig. 1 , where A = A d + ε∆, ε ≤ 1, and Let K = {2, 7} be the set of misbehaving agents, and let x(0) ∞ ≤ 1. Consider the agent 1, and let (F 2 , E 2 , M 2 , H 2 ) and (F 3 , E 3 , M 3 , H 3 ) be, respectively, the residual generators as in (2) and (3), where
) be the impulse response from the input u 2 (resp. u 7 ) tor 3 , and let u 1 2 (resp. u 1 7 ) denote the input signal u 2 (resp. u 7 ) up to time 1. Because the filters (F 2 , E 2 , M 2 , H 2 ) and (F 3 , E 3 , M 3 , H 3 ) converge in two steps, 4 the misbehaving agent can be identified after 2 time steps. After some computation, denoting the convolution operator, the residual associated with the agent 3 iŝ
or, equivalently,
. Analogously, we havê
The agent 1 is able to identify the misbehaving agent 2 if r 2 (1) ∞ > r 3 (1) ∞ independently of u . Let the inputs u 2 and u 7 take value in U = {u :
and, after some computation, if 47 < α < ε −1 , in which case we conclude that the agent 1 correctly identifies the misbehaving agent 2. The analysis of other possible pair of misbehaving agents can be done analogously.
V. HIERARCHICAL ESTIMATION AND DETECTION
The previous section shows how to detect a misbehaving agent under limited knowledge of the overall system. The proposed algorithm relies on the key assumption that the magnitude of the misbehaving signal is within an interval whose size strictly depends on the parameters of the system. In this section we present an alternative method that constrains neither the input function, nor the network topology, while maintaining the assumption of local knowledge. We introduce a hierarchical structure that reduces, however, the decentralization of the network by allowing for the presence of a subset of nodes (leaders) with better communication and computation capabilities. Before considering the detection problem, we exploit the presence of this hierarchical structure for solving the state estimation problem in a linear system with unknown inputs. To be more precise, in Subsection V-A we propose an algorithm that allows each leader to recover the state x(0) in a finite number of steps. In Subsection V-B we modify the estimation algorithm for the detection of misbehaving agents. While illustrating our algorithms we characterize also the local knowledge of the network required by each leader to accomplish the state estimation and the detection goals.
A. Hierarchical unknown input state estimation
Consider the linear network 5 x(t + 1) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) and let G = (V, E) be the graph associated with the matrix A. Let V ( ) = { 1 , . . . , m } ⊆ V denote the subset of the leaders. We assume the presence of a directed graph
, where E ( ) ⊆ V ( ) ×V ( ) describes the feasible communications among the leaders. We assume that G ( ) is strongly connected, and we refer to it as to the leader graph. Let N ( ) i denote the neighbor set of the leader i in G ( ) . As in Section II, the information of the state x(t) directly available to the leader i is given by y i (t) = C i x(t), where C i is defined according to the neighbor set N i in G. The composite information available to the set of leaders can be conveniently described by the output matrix
T . We now show how our hierarchical setup can be conveniently used to solve the unknown input state estimation problem, in which the input matrix B is known by the leaders, while the input signal u(t) is unknown and unmeasurable. For s ∈ N, let
. . (1) yi (2) . . .
The results presented in this section hold for general linear networks, i.e., they are not restricted to consensus dynamics. and
. . .
where U s contains the input sequence from time 0 up to time s − 1. From [7] we know that a system is finite-time unknown input observable (UIO), i.e., the initial state x(0) can be recovered without knowing the input signal, if and only if there exists an integer d < |V | such that
In particular conditions (4) imply that x(0) can be computed as the solution of the system
To see this, let I n denote the n-dimensional identity matrix, and observe that
where, given two subspaces A and B, A ⊥ B denotes the orthogonal projection of A on B. Let
where † denotes the pseudo-inverse operation, then, from (5), we havex = x(0). Consider the basic algebraic equality
which leads to the useful geometric interpretation of (6) that is next described. For i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, let
. Then x coincides with the projection on the subspace Im Let the network G be a two dimensional lattice with (ab) 2 agents, and let the network be partitioned into b 2 identical blocks containing a 2 vertices each. An example with b = 3 and a = 3 is in Fig. 2 . Let A describe a linear consensus algorithm on G. Let V i , with i ∈ {1, . . . , b 2 }, denote the set of agents belonging to the i-th block, and let the central vertex l i ∈ V i represent the i-th leader. We assume that the leaders l i and l j are connected through an undirected edge if there exists h 1 ∈ V i and h 2 ∈ V j that are connected in G. We focus on leader l 1 and we analyze the performance of Algorithm 1 and 2 as a function of the parameters a and b.
A. State estimation
We compare here the performance of Algorithm 1 with the method proposed in [8] , where the state is recovered by relying on the observability property of the pair (A, C l1 ). We show that, although theoretically correct, the latter method suffers from numerical instability when the dimension of A grows. Let a = 3 and b = 3, and compute the condition number 8 of the observability matrix of the pair (A, C ( ) k ), where C ( ) k is the composite output matrix associated with the leader set V
